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THE “BAD MAN” GOES TO WASHINGTON:  
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON 
CORPORATE DUTY 
Jill E. Fisch* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Holmesian “bad man” figure has generated extensive commentary.1  
Much of this commentary has been critical—berating Oliver Wendell 
Holmes for his consequentialist approach to the law and his implication that 
legal rules impart no normative content to conduct apart from the costs that 
they impose.2  Some scholars have argued flatly that Holmes was wrong, 
while others have attempted to rework the bad man into a more sympathetic 
creature. 
The critics’ central concern is Holmes’s rejection of an independent duty 
to obey the law based on moral or ethical principles.  Scholars portray the 
bad man as exploiting the legal system for his own selfish ends.  Ethics 
scholars in particular have resisted the implications of Holmes’s approach 
for the role of the lawyer, claiming it inappropriately justifies aggressive 
representation that stretches the limits of the law and conflicts with its 
spirit.  Theorists question whether a set of rules can reasonably be called a 
legal system if it fails to create obligations to obey and instead merely sets 
costs or penalties for noncompliance.3 
Perhaps somewhat striking is the absence of the bad man from academic 
commentary in corporate law.  Although corporations and their executives 
 
* T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham University School of Law.  I am 
grateful to the participants in the Fordham Symposium The Internal Point of View in Law 
and Ethics, to the faculties of Rutgers-Camden Law School and Florida State Law School, 
and to Curtis Bridgeman and Ben Zipursky for their helpful comments. 
 1. The bad man figure appears in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 
Harv. L. Rev. 991, 993 (1997).  The figure and Holmes’s essay have been the subject of 
numerous articles, books, and symposia. See, e.g., The Path of the Law and Its Influence:  
The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) [hereinafter The 
Path of the Law and Its Influence]; Symposium, The Path of the Law 100 Years Later:  
Holmes’s Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1 (1997); Symposium, The 
Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1997); Symposium, The 
Path of the Law Today, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 691 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 515, 555-57 (1997) 
(describing various academic reactions to the “bad man”). 
 3. See Abner S. Greene, Against Obligation:  A Theory of Permeable Sovereignty 6 
(Jan. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and the Fordham Law Review) 
(describing conditions under which a set of rules constitutes a legal system). 
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have been heavily criticized for their lack of morality, their selfishness, and 
their consequentialist approach to regulation, scholars, for the most part, 
have not looked to Holmes for insights into corporate decision making. 
The exception is scholars in progressive corporate law.  These scholars 
identify the analogy between the bad man and the amoral corporation and 
then look to Holmes’s normative characterization as a justification for 
advocating greater corporate social responsibility.  Numerous examples of 
corporate conduct appear to justify this concern, as corporate actors—from 
Standard Oil and the railroads, to today’s WorldCom and Enron—seem to 
personify immoral greed at the expense of moral and ethical values. 
However, the quest for moral guidance jeopardizes the application of the 
bad man to the corporation.  Holmes’s bad man could become good if he 
acted unselfishly and incorporated the “vaguer sanctions of conscience” 
into his behavior.4  The corporation cannot; it lacks an authoritative source 
of moral reasoning, leaving it little alternative but to rely on legal rules as 
limits on its actions.  Reliance on legal limits is problematic, however, in 
light of the corporation’s substantial ability to modify these constraints 
through political activity.  Holmes’s bad man is detached from the legal 
system and takes the existing legal rules as fixed, external constraints.  The 
corporation does not. 
Given these differences and, in particular, the mutability of legal rules for 
the corporation, does Holmes’s bad man have anything to say with respect 
to the appropriate role of the corporation in the political process and the 
lawyer who represents that corporation?  Although this essay merely offers 
preliminary musings, it suggests that potential insights from Holmes have 
been overlooked, both in understanding the political process and in 
structuring the role of the corporation and its lawyer within that process. 
Because there are numerous models and explanations of the Holmesian 
bad man, this essay begins in Part I with a brief exploration of the bad man 
figure and its applicability to the corporation.  Part II considers the role of 
the bad man in progressive corporate scholarship and the basis by which the 
bad man analogy is used to advocate increased corporate social 
responsibility.  Part III introduces the role of corporations in the political 
process, demonstrating how the corporation, unlike the Holmesian bad man, 
actively participates in and affects the creation of the law to which it is 
subject.  Finally, Part IV considers the implications of the political bad man 
and explores how Holmes’s insights can assist in understanding the role of 
the corporation and its lawyer in the political process. 
I.  THE HOLMESIAN BAD MAN 
Any in-depth excursion into The Path of the Law and the Holmesian bad 
man is clearly beyond the scope of this essay.  I am neither an expert on 
Holmes nor a legal philosopher, and those who have studied Holmes far 
 
 4. See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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more than I continue to argue about exactly what he meant.  Nonetheless, 
because it remains subject to extensive debate, it is worth considering 
briefly who the bad man is and why he is bad. 
Holmes described the bad man as someone “who cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge [of the law] enables him to 
predict.”5  The bad man “cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed 
and practised by his neighbors.”6  In short, the bad man cares about the law 
because of the sanctions imposed for violating it.  Holmes contrasts the bad 
man with the good man, “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside 
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”7  This good 
man employs Hart’s “internal point of view” and obeys the law out of a 
sense of obligation that is (at least partially) independent of the law’s 
consequences.8 
Why is the bad man bad?  Holmes clearly could have engaged in the 
same task of distinguishing law from morals or ethics without the bad man 
figure.  Moreover, the bad man label is strikingly normative.  In part, it 
seems that Holmes uses the bad man to highlight the compulsory nature of 
regulation.  Sanctions imposed by the threat of government force compel 
obedience both from good men, who follow the law out of a sense of social 
or moral obligation, and bad men, who follow the law simply because they 
want to avoid paying a penalty or going to jail.  Additionally, the bad man 
does not respond to moral arguments—the fact that certain conduct is 
unethical or inconsistent with societal norms does not matter to him.9  Thus, 
in the context of advising future lawyers, Holmes instructs them that, for 
the bad client, their advice must be framed in terms of consequences rather 
than reasons.10  Finally, the bad man is selfish; he acts out of self interest, 
not out of regard for the greater community.11  Importantly, however, the 
bad man is not a criminal.12  Nor does he ignore the law—although Holmes 
 
 5. Holmes, supra note 1, at 993. 
 6. Id. at 992. 
 7. Id. at 993. 
 8. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of the Law (1961) (describing the internal 
point of view). 
 9. As Judge Richard Posner convincingly argues, although the law overlaps with moral 
principles, there is considerable difference between the two.  The law does not enforce many 
moral principles, and, at the same time, “the law prohibits or attaches sanctions to a great 
deal of morally indifferent conduct.” Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Lectures:  The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1695 
(1998). 
 10. “[O]ur friend the bad man . . . does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, 
but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in 
fact.” Holmes, supra note 1, at 994. 
 11. William Twining suggests that the bad man employs a “user perspective.” William 
Twining, Other People’s Power:  The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997, 63 
Brook. L. Rev. 189, 212 (1997). 
 12. In describing the bad man’s consequentialist analysis, Holmes explicitly “leav[es] 
the criminal law on one side.” Holmes, supra note 1, at 994.  Holmes later explains, “If the 
typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep seated an organic 
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indicates that the bad man may view legal sanctions as the price to be paid 
for violating the law, he does not suggest that the bad man will fail to pay 
that price.13 
Despite the calculated use of the term “bad,” Holmes seems not to have 
persuaded subsequent commentators, many of whom resist the 
characterization.14  David Luban considers “the bad man [as] a realistic 
picture of the usual corporate client of Holmes’s day.”15  Sandy Levinson 
and J.M. Balkin reformulate the bad man as the self-reliant man, who does 
not seem very bad at all.16  Catharine Peirce Wells describes the bad man as 
an outsider, “someone who does not share in the ideals that the law 
represents,” such as a “feminist,” a “gay activist,” or a “Moonie.”17  Law 
and economics scholars embrace the bad man as the rational economic 
actor.18  Still other commentators argue that the bad man is simply a 
heuristic, a tool for examining the law from a specific and limited 
perspective.19 
I am not sure I agree with Holmes that the failure to second-guess legal 
limits by imposing extralegal moral scrutiny makes someone bad.  In my 
view, the bad man can be understood as someone who lacks a moral 
compass.20  In that case, the bad man must take the law as an independent 
and arguably complete set of rules that constrain his conduct.  In the 
absence of an alternative moral viewpoint, the bad man uses morality 
 
necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him by the 
classical method of imprisonment.” Id. at 1002. 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 994 (“[T]he party taking another man’s property has to pay its fair 
value as assessed by a jury, and no more.”). 
 14. Other commentators, however, claim that the bad man is truly bad, wicked, or evil. 
See, e.g., Catharine Peirce Wells, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and William James:  The Bad 
Man and the Moral Life, in The Path of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 211, 224 
(describing David Siepp’s characterization of Holmes’s bad man as “a real evildoer”). 
 15. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer, in The Path of the Law and Its 
Influence, supra note 1, at 33, 43. 
 16. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, The “Bad Man,” the Good, and the Self-
Reliant, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 899 (1998) (describing the “self-reliant man”). 
 17. Wells, supra note 14, at 225. 
 18. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic 
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577, 1591 (2000) (describing the acceptance 
by law and economics scholars of the rational bad man as the decision maker in their 
analysis). 
 19. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Hidden Holmes:  His Theory of Torts in History 48-
49 (1995) (describing Holmes as “advocat[ing] the ‘bad man’ heuristic . . . to facilitate 
testing legal concepts and theories in the ‘dry light’ of experience”); Thomas C. Grey, 
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 826-28 (1989) (describing Holmes’s 
“heuristic purpose” as defined by the legal perspective “of a private lawyer counseling a 
client”). 
 20. This terminology belongs to Jack Beermann. See Jack M. Beermann, Holmes’s Good 
Man:  A Comment on Levinson and Balkin, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 937, 941 (1998) (describing the 
bad man’s lack of a “moral compass”).  Alternatively, the bad man may have a moral 
compass, but reject it as an authoritative guide for his actions.  Thus, the bad man may lack 
confidence in his ability to make moral judgments or may refuse to privilege his personal 
moral views above those of society as reflected explicitly in existing law. 
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neither to supplement legal constraints nor as a justification for ignoring 
them. 
Moreover, it is unclear that a moral compass aids in legal compliance.  
Perhaps in a personal sense, we want people to be moral, but from a legal 
perspective, it is not clear that having people do an individual cost-benefit 
analysis is better than having them simply follow legal rules.  Indeed, many 
have argued that the value of a legal system lies in its ability to settle, albeit 
not resolve, moral conflict.  To the extent that morality enables one to 
continue to defy a controversial rule with which one disagrees, its role in 
the legal system is problematic, and commentators have struggled to defend 
a role for moral analysis on this issue that does not undercut the integrity of 
the legal system.21 
An additional concern is the extent to which the bad man will be 
constrained by legal sanctions.  Some commentators have worried that, in 
predicting the cost of disobeying the law, the bad man will not simply 
calculate the cost of legal sanctions, but will further consider the likelihood 
that those sanctions will be imposed.22  Robert Gordon terms this a 
“restate[ment] . . . [of the Holmesian] ‘bad man’s’ view of legal rules as 
prices discounted by sanctions—or, to reduce it still further, by the 
probability of enforcement of sanctions.”23  Albert Altschulter has observed 
that, under a strict reading of Holmes, it would appear that unenforced law 
is not law at all.24 
Although this reading of Holmes is plausible, I do not read Holmes as 
incorporating the risk of nonenforcement into the bad man’s calculation.25  
As Luban suggests, “There is no hint in Path or elsewhere that Holmes 
understood that risk-benefit analysis by a genuinely bad man ‘who cares 
only for the material consequences’ would consider enforcement 
probabilities as well as enforcement outcomes.”26  Indeed, Luban argues 
that such an interpretation would render Holmes’s bad man thesis 
“preposterous.”27  I agree with Luban.  As I read Holmes, the bad man is 
 
 21. Indeed, Mark DeWolfe Howe explains that the explicit reason for Holmes’s effort to 
separate the law from morality was that “he wanted men to obey even those rules of law 
which they believed to be unjust.” Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 532 (1951). 
 22. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of 
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1291 (1998). 
 23. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?:  The Corporate Counselor After 
Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1192 (2003). 
 24. Albert W. Altschuler, The Descending Trail:  Holmes’ Path of the Law One 
Hundred Years Later, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 353, 368-69 (1997). 
 25. See also Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart:  The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in 
The Path of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 158, 179 (explaining that Holmes is 
predicting the law not from the bad man’s point of view about the probability of 
enforcement, but from the perspective of courts and legislatures about the threat of legal 
liability). 
 26. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer:  A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s 
The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1571 (1997) (quoting Oliver Wendel Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 171 (Harold J. Laski ed., 1920)). 
 27. Id. 
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labeled “bad” because of his reasons for obeying the law, not his predicted 
failure to do so.  Moreover, rather than describing the expected cost to the 
bad man of violating the law, Holmes describes legal liability as requiring 
that the bad man make “compulsory payment” of “fair value.”28 
In any event, law and economics tells us that the risk of nonenforcement 
could, from a deterrence perspective, be addressed through modifications to 
the sanction for noncompliance.  If the bad man does factor in the 
likelihood that he can get away with violating legal rules, society only need 
increase the penalty for noncompliance to a sufficient level to compensate 
for the probability of nonenforcement.29  Alternatively, society can impose 
extra-compensatory penalties, such as punitive damages, for deliberate 
violations of legal obligations.30 
An additional and related concern is the bad man’s view of legal liability 
as simply a price for noncompliance with the law.  In his essay, Holmes 
argues that, for the bad man, legal rules impose costs on certain types of 
conduct but lack independent normative force.  From the bad man’s point of 
view, “what is the difference between being fined and being taxed a certain 
sum for doing a certain thing?”31  Thus, a bad man may drive recklessly if 
he is willing to pay for the cost of an accident.  A supplier may breach a 
contract if he can sell his product at a higher price, so long as he is willing 
to pay damages to the first buyer. 
Cynthia Williams criticizes this law-as-price approach for understating 
the normative significance of the law and for implying that compliance with 
the law is purely voluntary.32  In part, I believe that the Holmesian bad man 
is designed to push our analysis on this issue.  In the end, however, I think 
Williams’s characterization is an overstatement.  Even if legal rules carry 
no normative force, the rational actor’s cost-benefit calculation is likely to 
be richer than Williams suggests and, in most cases, weighed heavily in 
favor of compliance.  There are generalized effects to violating legal rules 
systematically—reputational penalties, loss of goodwill, increased visibility 
to potential regulators, and so forth.  The potential contract breacher must 
consider not just the efficiency of his case-specific breach, but the effect on 
his future ability to enter into contracts with others.  Although the bad man 
may not consider the consequences of his legal violations on “the social-
 
 28. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994. 
 29. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal Stud. 
319, 324 (1996) (arguing that appropriate levels of deterrence will be achieved by setting the 
penalty for misconduct equal to the social cost of that misconduct “adjusted for the 
probability of nondetection”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs 
and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & Econ. 133, 133 (1992) 
(same). 
 30. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 29, at 348 (observing that punitive damages 
can serve as a mechanism for adjusting penalties to reflect the probability of nondetection). 
 31. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994. 
 32. Williams, supra note 22, at 1269 (criticizing the “voluntaristic approach to law” 
resulting from treating legal sanctions as prices). 
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structuring function of law,”33 there is no reason for him to ignore the effect 
of those violations on his own future dealings. 
Moreover, I do not read Holmes to be making this argument.  
Concededly, Holmes states that the significance of legal rules for the bad 
man is limited to their consequences.  The bad man, in Holmes’s view, does 
not care to evaluate his actions in terms of some moral theory; for him, the 
significance of legal rules is the disagreeable consequences associated with 
their violation.  But it is important to remember that this description of the 
law is through the eyes of the bad man.  Having defined the bad man as one 
lacking a moral compass, Holmes correctly observes that the association of 
a legal penalty with an action will not cause the bad man to condemn that 
action as morally corrupt.  Holmes does not, and I think would not, make 
the broader claim that legal rules and sanctions have no independent moral 
force to anyone.  His essay explicitly avoids the question of whether one 
can or should have an independent moral duty to obey the law, and the bad 
man is, after all, in his terms, “bad.” 
In addition to the question of whether and why the bad man is bad, 
commentators have debated the utility of the bad man metaphor and the 
validity of Holmes’s philosophical approach to the law, as embodied in the 
bad man.  Thus, for example, Henry Hart states that he is unable to see the 
value of the bad man metaphor, “unless to make us more effective 
counsellors of evil.”34  Stephen Perry, in contrast, argues that “the bad man 
captured something fundamental about human nature” and that “in an 
important sense people really are ‘bad men.’”35 
Regardless of the broader debate about the bad man, which is too 
extensive to detail here, commentators have suggested that the bad man is 
of particular utility in understanding the corporation and its duty to obey the 
law.  Of particular relevance is the fact that corporations, like the bad man, 
lack an internal moral compass.  Because corporations are artificial entities, 
it is difficult to identify a source of their moral obligations.36  As I have 
argued elsewhere, there is no reason to believe that corporations share the 
social, moral, or ethical obligations of natural persons.37  Moreover, 
because corporations are composed of multiple constituencies with various 
claims, moral and otherwise, one cannot readily look to individual 
 
 33. Id. at 1277. 
 34. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 932 
(1951). 
 35. Perry, supra note 25, at 167-68. 
 36. At the core, this difficulty may stem from the reification of the corporation, which 
leads to the conception of an independent entity with preferences and interests that may be 
distinct from those of the individual participants in the enterprise. See, e.g., William A. 
Klein, Business Organization and Finance:  Legal and Economic Principles 99 (1980) 
(warning that reification of the corporation can be dangerous because it may cause us to 
overlook the fact that “only individuals enjoy the benefits, or bear the burdens and the 
responsibilities, of actions affecting other individuals”). 
 37. See Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate Governance 
Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1091, 1099 (1997). 
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corporate stakeholders as a source of corporate morality.  Whether or not 
human actors have ethical and moral obligations to obey the law, 
corporations are more easily understood as amoral.  As Daniel Fischel 
explains, 
A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a 
nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily 
entered into for their mutual benefit.  Since it is a legal fiction, a 
corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the 
same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having these 
obligations.38 
William Twining argues, “[I]s not the perspective of a large bureaucratic 
corporation whose sole or primary aim is maximization of profit very close 
to that of the ‘bad man’—amoral, rational, calculating, purposeful, pursuing 
its own agenda?”39  Thus the bad man, with his nonexistent moral compass, 
offers us a mechanism for understanding the duties imposed on amoral 
corporations by the law.40 
There are, of course, limitations to the analogy.  One significant 
difference between the corporation and the Holmesian bad man is the 
corporation’s participation in the political process by which legal rules are 
created, a subject that this essay will consider further in Parts III and IV.  A 
second difference is the significant role of the market as a constraint on 
corporate decision making.  The relationship between regulation and market 
forces as constraints on corporate conduct is complex and beyond the scope 
of this essay.41 
II.  THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Despite the potential utility of the bad man metaphor for evaluating 
corporate decision making, it has received little attention in corporate law 
scholarship.  The bad man has found his way into tort law, professional 
responsibility, contracts, and many other areas, but not corporate law.  The 
exception is progressive corporate law scholarship.42 
 
 38. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 
1273 (1982). 
 39. Twining, supra note 11, at 210. 
 40. It is tempting to extend the metaphor—identifying the recent misdeeds of corporate 
officials such as Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Bernard Ebbers, Dennis Kozlowski, and 
many more—as the acts of the Holmesian bad man corporation.  The analogy is misplaced—
the corporate misconduct involved was the misconduct of individual corporate actors who 
were acting both criminally and in opposition to the interests of the corporate entity. 
 41. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Business and Its Environment 133 (3d ed. 2000) 
(explaining the relationship between market and nonmarket activities, including regulation, 
and their effect on corporate behavior); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977) (describing 
various markets that constrain corporations). 
 42. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!  A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 
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Progressive corporate law is characterized by its view that corporations 
have obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders and the public generally, 
and that these obligations include duties of fairness and morality that extend 
beyond legal and contractual rules.43  Alternatively characterized as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), the scholarship finds its roots in 
Merrick Dodd’s 1932 claim that corporate managers “should concern 
themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general 
public, as well as of the stockholders.”44  As The Economist has 
characterized it, the CSR literature is premised on a “perceived tension 
between private profit and public interest,” a tension that is simply 
“regarded as self-evident.”45  Progressive scholars argue that corporations 
have a responsibility to society to act as good citizens, and that this 
responsibility should either be effectuated through voluntary ethical 
behavior that extends beyond the corporation’s legal obligations46 or 
through increased regulation.47 
 
87 Va. L. Rev. 1279, 1295-97 (2001) (criticizing the “bad man’s calculus” in the context of 
noting “the difficulties inherent in establishing a coherent, persuasive, and workable theory 
of a corporation’s duty to obey the law”); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s 
Education:  Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) The Business 
Judgment Rule, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 799, 850-51 (1997) (describing corporations as “bad men” 
for employing cost-benefit analysis); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in 
the Modern Corporation:  An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. 
Rev. 477, 512 (1995) (arguing that the bad man approach “has led to a very low required 
standard of behavior” in the context of corporate decision making). 
 43. See generally Progressive Corporate Law (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (series of 
essays by a number of progressive corporate law scholars).  The “progressive” label 
overstates the commonality among the positions of these scholars. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Community and Statism:  A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 887-89 (1997) (book review) 
(highlighting individual differences in approach). 
 44. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1145, 1156 (1932).  Dodd’s article was a response to Adolf Berle’s article arguing that 
corporate managers were trustees with an obligation to run the corporation in the best 
interests of its shareholders. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
Harv. L. Rev. 1049 1074 (1931).  Ultimately, Dodd largely yielded to Berle’s position. See 
E. Merrick Dodd, Dimock and Hyde:  Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations, 
9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538, 547 (1942) (book review) (conceding that it was misleading to 
consider managers as trustees for non-shareholder stakeholders). 
 45. The World According to CSR, The Good Company, Jan. 22, 2005, at 10, Economist, 
Jan. 22-28, 2005. 
 46. See, e.g., David Hess, Social Reporting:  A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate 
Social Responsiveness, 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 41, 52 (1999) (defining corporate social 
responsibility to include “meeting society’s expectations of proper business conduct that is 
not necessarily codified (i.e., ethical responsibilities)”). 
 47. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and 
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581, 599 (2002) 
(“Even if one assumes that a maximization of utility should be the end goal, government 
intervention is often necessary to repair market defects and thereby to maximize utility.  
Externalities, collective action problems, ‘prisoners’ dilemmas,’ inadequate information, 
tragedies of the common, and natural monopolies may all result from market forces and can 
make it impossible to maximize social utility.  Thus, government regulation of corporations 
is necessary even under a utilitarian social calculus.”). 
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Progressive scholars, in particular, find the bad man metaphor a powerful 
tool in criticizing existing corporate conduct that, although technically 
legal, appears socially harmful.  Corporations pollute the environment.  
Corporations pay their employees (at least nonexecutive employees) too 
little.  Corporations manufacture dangerous products.  These actions are 
attributed to the corporation’s selfish objective of maximizing profit at the 
expense of net social welfare.48 
The attributed corporate greed is exacerbated by the fact that corporations 
rely extensively on cost-benefit analysis.  As Kent Greenfield and John 
Nilsson explain, “[E]ven Oliver Wendell Holmes said that it was ‘bad men’ 
who made decisions based on cost-benefit analysis.”49  Perhaps the best 
known example of a corporation being vilified for the use of cost-benefit 
analysis is the Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.50  Thus, Marc 
Galanter and David Luban describe the jury’s response upon learning of 
Ford’s reliance on cost-benefit analysis as a desire to condemn “the 
particular kind of wickedness displayed in Ford’s reluctance to recall the 
exploding Pintos:  it was greed, allowing one’s decision to be swayed by 
the sheer magnitude of money.”51 
The bad man offers some traction here.  In part, the metaphor serves as a 
rhetorical device by labeling amoral corporate decisions as selfish and 
bad.52  It is precisely the absence of an independent moral constraint, and 
the mere “technical” legal compliance, that commentators view as 
problematic—the same characteristics that arguably render the bad man 
bad.  Lawrence Mitchell argues that corporations are “morally 
irresponsible; they are able to deflect moral responsibility for their 
decisions to the command of law.”53  Joel Bakan criticizes corporations for 
their “pathological pursuit of profit and power.”54  Bradley Wendell states 
that Enron’s abuse of special purpose entities was “abetted by the 
Holmesian bad man attitudes of lawyers and accountants, who in effect 
agreed with Fastow that if the rules do not explicitly prohibit an act, it is 
permissible.”55 
In addition, if the corporation is a Holmesian bad man, it cannot be 
trusted to act responsibly.  Thus, progressive scholars argue that the law 
 
 48. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 42, at 502 (explaining that corporations are “dumping 
pollutants, diluting baby food, or selling dangerous products” because corporate law defines 
the corporate objective as self-interested profit maximization). 
 49. Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 42, at 850 n.207. 
 50. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 51. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:  Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1437 (1993). 
 52. Cf. Ernest L. Folk III, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 
S.C. L. Rev. 275, 307 (1963) (arguing that because most enterprises appeal to high 
standards, “Holmes’ ‘bad man’ theory of law properly has little application to corporation 
law”). 
 53. Mitchell, supra note 42, at 505. 
 54. Joel Bakan, The Corporation:  The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (2004). 
 55. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167, 
1224 (2005). 
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should respond by rejecting the free market approach in favor of more 
extensive regulation.  If the corporation responds only to legal limits, those 
limits must be more restrictive.  Concededly, scholars have moved away 
from a highly regulatory approach in favor of increased disclosure or 
broader definitions of the corporation’s objectives.  In the end, though, to 
the extent that these approaches displace market-based contractual 
solutions, they are still government-imposed restrictions on corporate 
decisions.56 
The bad man model operates as a double-edged sword, however, for 
progressive corporate law scholarship.  Whether corporations are to 
increase their social responsibility voluntarily or on the basis of increased 
regulation, the progressive argument essentially asks that they limit their 
behavior in accordance with a set of additional social, moral, or ethical 
obligations extending beyond existing law.  But where is this set of 
obligations to come from?  Holmes highlights the distinction between moral 
and legal obligations, but a corporation as an entity lacks an internal point 
of view that can serve as a source of moral obligations. 
The corporation cannot readily adopt the moral perspective of its 
individual constituents.  Shareholders may define the corporation’s 
objectives in broad terms57—and indeed, they sometimes include social 
obligations within the corporate contract58—but they do not have the legal 
authority to make operational decisions.  As for officers and directors, those 
with the authority to make corporate decisions, there is little reason to 
believe their ethical views mirror those of society.  Moreover, to the extent 
that corporate officials impose their personal moral views on the 
corporation, they abuse their fiduciary obligations as agents.  Finally, 
various corporate stakeholders may have differing moral perspectives.59  As 
William James observed, there is no methodology for incorporating 
pluralistic moral views into a single scale.60 
 
 56. See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of 
Contracts:  Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 
1189, 1238 (1991) (characterizing free market proponents as “shar[ing] Holmes’s bad man 
perception of the law with respect to legal rules that restrict people’s ability to contract”). 
 57. The appropriate definition of the corporation’s objectives in terms of shareholder 
primacy or furthering the interests of multiple stakeholders is beyond the scope of this essay.  
For a more detailed consideration of the issue, see Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law:  The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 637 (2006) 
(advocating a broader measure of firm value than shareholder wealth). 
 58. Ben & Jerry’s, for example, was well known for donating 7.5% of corporate profits, 
five times the business average, to philanthropy. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Two Dips:  The 
Gospel According to Ben & Jerry:  Is Feel Good Capitalism Good for Charity?, 
Philanthropy Mag., Oct. 1, 1997, http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/article.asp?article= 
1375&paper=0&cat=148 (describing the company’s efforts to incorporate social values into 
business operations). 
 59. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 57 (identifying varying interests and perspectives of 
different corporate stakeholders). 
 60. William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in Essays in Pragmatism 
65, 77 (1948). 
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If the corporation cannot evaluate its conduct from an internal point of 
view, it has no basis for weighing the social costs and benefits of its actions.  
Accordingly, it has no choice but to view legal rules, which reflect societal 
values and which have been implemented through democratic principles, as 
the exclusive constraints on its decisions. 
This then limits the scope of the progressive claim.  If corporations have 
a responsibility to society, that responsibility must be reflected in the 
corporation’s legal obligations.  If society views corporate conduct as 
socially harmful, the solution is not to urge higher ethical standards, but to 
prohibit objectionable behavior through bans on toxic dumping, minimum 
wage laws, and consumer safety regulations.  Similarly, corporate actions 
that distort the market can be addressed through regulatory mechanisms 
such as antitrust laws and truth-in-advertising requirements.  Within legal 
limits, corporations have the right to act selfishly by maximizing firm value. 
From a static perspective, this analysis makes sense.  If the corporation, 
like the Holmesian bad man, is an outsider to the law, legal rules are the 
appropriate mechanism for ensuring that the corporation acts in accordance 
with societal values.  Unlike the bad man, however, the corporation is not 
external to the lawmaking process.  Society does not impose legal rules 
upon the corporation; corporations actively participate in the process of 
creating, molding, and modifying those rules.  The next section briefly 
considers the nature and extent of corporate participation in the political 
process.  The following section explores the implications of that 
participation in the context of the Holmesian bad man. 
III.  CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
Despite the fact that they lack the power to vote, corporations have long 
been active participants in the political process.  The role of corporations in 
politics dates back to the turn of the century61 and is likely due to at least 
four factors:  (1) the increasing size and importance of corporations and 
business generally following the industrial revolution and liberalization of 
state corporate law; (2) the increasing role of regulation, which heightened 
the importance of law for business; (3) the growth in national political 
parties, which shifted and focused the process of political participation;62 
and (4) the growing cost of political campaigns. 
At the outset, corporate political activity consisted largely of money 
donations—political contributions and even bribes.  Regulation was a 
response to revelations about the growing size and importance of these 
donations.  For example, corporate contributions comprised more than 
 
 61. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 Bus. 
Law. 155, 158-59 (2005) (describing “American business history . . . as an ongoing cat-and-
mouse game between regulators . . . and business leaders”). 
 62. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1131-32 (2002) (describing 
the growth and effect of national political parties). 
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seventy percent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign chest, including 
contributions of $150,000 from J.P. Morgan Co. and $125,000 from 
Standard Oil.63  The press reported allegations of bribes and extortion, 
including, perhaps most famously, published letters from E.H. Harriman 
stating that he had acquired influence in Washington by raising $200,000 
for the Republican campaign.64 
As Congress responded by barring direct contributions,65 corporations 
developed a variety of alternatives.  Political action committees (PACs) 
allow corporations to make campaign contributions through funds that are 
collected from employees and stockholders and segregated from the 
corporate treasury.  The formation and use of corporate PACs increased 
dramatically in the late 1970s and continues to be an important area of 
political spending.  According to the Federal Election Commission, PAC 
spending during the 2003-2004 election totaled $310.5 million.66  
Currently, approximately forty percent of all PACs are corporate PACs, 
although by most estimates, corporate PAC expenditures comprise only a 
small percentage of total campaign spending.67 
Soft money donations are donations made to the national political parties 
rather than to the candidates themselves.  Corporate soft money donations, 
which were, for a time, unrestricted by regulation, exploded in the 1990s, 
growing from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million during the 2000 election 
campaign.68  Subsequently, Congress banned corporate soft money 
donations in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).69 
Although PAC expenditures and soft money donations have received the 
majority of the attention directed to corporate political activity, such 
expenditures are often dwarfed by lobbying expenses.  Corporations spend 
millions of dollars annually seeking political influence through lobbying.  
 
 63. Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts:  The Making of Federal 
Campaign Finance Law 3 (1988). 
 64. Id. at 9-10. 
 65. The first federal campaign finance law, the Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 
34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)), barred federally 
chartered corporations from making campaign contributions and barred all corporations from 
making contributions in connection with an election for federal office.  In addition, 
disclosure regulations required political candidates and committees to report their 
expenditures and the sources of their funding.  Because the disclosure regulations contained 
virtually no enforcement mechanism, and Congress did not require public disclosure of the 
reports until the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456, there are 
reasons to question the extent of compliance with the rules. Mutch, supra note 63, at 26-27. 
 66. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, PAC Activity Increases for 2004 Elections 
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050412pac/PACFinal2004.html. 
 67. E.g., Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 
Bus. & Pol. 75 (2000) (reporting that corporate political action committee (PAC) 
contributions account for about ten percent of congressional campaign spending). 
 68. Tom Hamburger, Broad Legal Attack May Undo Reform of Political Fund Raising, 
Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 
and 47 U.S.C.). 
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In 2004, for example, ExxonMobil reported PAC disbursements of 
$861,000, but disclosed that it had spent $7.7 million in the same year on 
lobbying.70  Corporate lobbying has suddenly been highlighted by the 
recent scandal in which Jack Abramoff pled guilty to conspiracy to bribe 
public officials.71 
Most recently, corporations have responded to the restrictions imposed 
by the BCRA by making contributions to independent political committees, 
known as “527 committees,” which in turn can make expenditures in 
support of specific political issues.  The committees are regulated by the 
IRS as nonprofits and operate outside the scope of federal and state 
campaign finance laws.  One of the largest, the Republican Governors 
Association, raised more than $18 million in 2004 and more than $9 million 
in 2005, largely from corporate donors.72 
Corporations also make direct expenditures in connection with issue 
advocacy.  One of the best known examples is the Harry and Louise 
television advertisement created by the insurance industry, through the 
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices,73 in an effort to defeat the Clinton 
Administration’s plan for health care reform.74  Corporations also curry 
favor with public officials through a variety of mechanisms—from offering 
them transportation on corporate jets to sponsoring campaign dinners and 
fund-raisers.  In response to the restrictions imposed by the BCRA, for 
example, many prominent corporate officials assisted the candidates in the 
2004 election by “bundling” the contributions of individual donors.75 
Despite the extensive regulatory restrictions on corporate political 
activity that have existed for a century and that continue to expand, as the 
 
 70. ExxonMobil, 2004 Corporate Citizenship Report 45 (2004), available at 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/ccr04_fullreport.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., Brody Mullins et al., Capitol Offense:  Guilty Plea by Lobbyist Raises 
Prospect of Wider Investigation, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (describing Jack Abramoff’s 
guilty plea and a government investigation into the possibility of more widespread lobbying 
corruption). 
 72. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Silent Partners:  Republican Governors Association, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/profile.aspx?act=dir&sub=1&cycle=2006&id=479 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
 73. SourceWatch, Coalition for Health Insurance Choices, 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Coalition_for_Health_Insurance_Choices (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2006); see Gary D. Wekkin, The “Blame Game”:  What Went Wrong with 
Health Care Reform, 5 White House Stud. 53, 53 (2005), available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KVD/is_1_5/ai_n15927746 (stating that the 
health care industry spent $30 million on the Harry and Louise advertising campaign). 
 74. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) also reduced corporate ability to 
engage in “issue advocacy” by broadening the definition of electioneering communications 
and prohibiting corporations from making such communications except through segregated 
funds. 
 75. See Tim Shorrock & Michael Scherer, Bundles of Influence, Mother Jones, May 1, 
2004, http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2004/05/04_405.html (describing fund-
raising efforts and political influence wielded by top republican bundlers including Pfizer 
CEO Henry “Hank” McKinnell); see also Oliver Staley, That’s a Bundle—1 Ranger Can 
Deliver Many Checks, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Aug. 27, 2004, at A1 (describing 
Republican Party rangers and pioneers). 
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summary above indicates, corporations persist in finding new ways to exert 
political influence.  At base, the explanation for this is simple:  Political 
activity is an integral component of a corporation’s business strategy.  
Modern corporations operate in an environment pervaded by regulation.  
Shaping and responding to that regulation is an element of a corporation’s 
operational strategy as much as marketplace competition. 
Telecommunications companies, for example, such as Qwest, Global 
Crossing, and WorldCom, have been criticized for spending millions of 
dollars in politics during the late 1990s, at the same time that the 
companies’ financial operations were unsustainable and they were engaged 
in widespread accounting frauds.76  Regulation, however, is critical to the 
telecommunications industry.77  Rate regulation, freedom of entry, and 
access to the internet are among the most significant issues affecting a 
company’s business plan and the profitability of its operations.78  The 
importance of regulation to the industry was borne out by the passage of the 
landmark 1996 federal telecommunications law.79  Among other things, by 
reducing the scope of federal regulation, the statute opened the door to 
extensive state regulatory efforts—from 1993 through the first half of 2005, 
there were 5187 bills introduced in state legislatures relating to 
telecommunications issues.80  A rewrite of the federal statute is pending, 
leaving open the extent and form of further deregulation.81 
Moreover, corporate political participation is effective.  Corporations are 
able to exert substantial influence on regulatory policy through their 
political activities and donations.  Although widely criticized as special 
interest legislation, examples of statutory responses to corporate political 
pressure abound.  Enron’s political contributions are widely credited with 
enabling it to eliminate protected energy monopolies.82  The enactment of 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,83 sometimes called “the 
Mickey Mouse law,” is attributed to extensive lobbying by the Walt Disney 
Company, which stood to lose copyright protection for Mickey Mouse in 
 
 76. Bruce F. Freed et al., Ctr. for Political Accountability, The Green Canary:  Alerting 
Shareholders and Protecting Their Investments 11-13 (2005), available at 
www.politicalaccountability.net/files/GreenCanaryFinalA.pdf. 
 77. John Dunbar, Former Bells Dial Up Big Numbers in Statehouses:  SBC Is No. 1 in 
Both Lobbying and Contributions, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Sept. 29, 2005, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=744. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (basing this finding on “a search of the LexisNexis database of state legislative 
activity”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1275, 1278-79 (2002) (describing Enron’s extensive and successful political efforts to 
eliminate energy monopolies). 
 83. The Act extended copyright protection for an additional twenty years for works still 
protected in 1998. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2000). 
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2003.84  Recent lobbying efforts by Hewlett-Packard Co. resulted in tax law 
changes that will save the company millions of dollars by reducing the tax 
on profits from the company’s foreign subsidiaries.85  Political 
heavyweights like FedEx have multi-decade histories of successfully 
influencing legislation.86 
Although the foregoing analysis is only a brief summary of the nature 
and effect of corporate political activity, it demonstrates that corporations 
cannot be viewed as outsiders to the legal system.  Corporations are not 
simply constrained by society’s legal rules; they play a substantial role in 
shaping the rules by which they are governed.  What is the significance of 
this role for Holmesian analysis?  How should the lack of moral 
accountability affect the conduct of the politically powerful bad man?  The 
answers to these questions are explored below. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL BAD MAN 
For the individual Holmesian bad man, existing legal constraints are 
externally imposed and largely immutable.  Indeed, as Twining has 
observed, “[f]or Hart, as well as Holmes, for the purpose of detached 
description, it is useful to conceive of law in terms of other people’s 
power.”87  The bad man metaphor is based on the premise that law consists 
of a set of externally imposed consequences—this is the reason that law 
restricts the actions of the bad man.  The law represents, for the bad man, 
the power behind the statute to impose sanctions upon those who violate 
it.88 
For corporations, however, the legal rules are themselves subject to 
change.  How does this affect the bad man approach to understanding the 
law?  And, in the context of The Path of the Law, how should lawyers 
counsel politically active corporations? 
These questions can be answered in several ways.  One possibility is that 
the bad man metaphor simply does not apply to corporations.  Corporations 
are not outsiders, but insiders; the legal rules with which they must comply 
 
 84. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 471, 483 (2003). 
 85. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street, Wash. Post, June 22, 
2005, at A1. 
 86. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?:  The FedEx Story, 58 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1495 (2005) (describing FedEx’s political activities in connection with several 
legislative issues).  For example, as a fledgling business struggling to survive in the late 
1970s, FedEx embarked on an extensive political campaign and was so visibly instrumental 
in the effort to deregulate air cargo that Washington insiders termed the resulting statute 
“The Federal Express Act.” See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation:  A Legal 
History, 30 Transp. L.J. 235, 335 (2003) (describing the name as resulting from “the speed 
by which [the bill] flew through Capitol Hill and the identity of its principal sponsor”). 
 87. Twining, supra note 11, at 198. 
 88. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, The Score as Contract:  Private Law and the Historically 
Informed Performance Movement, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1589, 1609 (1999) (explaining that 
under the positivist view as reflected in Holmes, “one obeys a statute because of the power 
behind the statute”). 
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are a product of their own actions.  As such, corporations do not share the 
perspective of the bad man.  Corporations do not necessarily view legal 
rules as the product of someone else’s power; instead, the rules may be 
sources of power for the corporation itself.  Indeed, legal rules can be a 
means by which one corporation constrains the activities of its 
competitors.89 
Although this interpretation of Holmes is plausible, there are reasons to 
reject it.  First, this Symposium is about Holmes and the bad man, and it 
would be poor form to conclude that these themes are irrelevant to the study 
of corporate law.  More importantly, the mutability of legal rules was well 
known to Holmes.  Holmes explicitly observed, in The Path of the Law, 
how readily the law could be changed:  “We do not realize how large a part 
of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the 
public mind.”90  Corporations in the late 1800s, like corporations today, 
figured prominently in shaping and changing the law.  As Gordon argues, 
Holmes was well aware that the corporate lawyer of his era was “an active 
shaper of [the law], a drafter of bills favoring his clients and a lobbyist to 
push them through legislatures.”91  Indeed, Congress passed the first 
campaign finance law, the Tillman Act, in 1904, in an effort to reduce 
corporate political influence as a response to reported scandals at the turn of 
the century.92 
A second possibility is that the bad man metaphor demonstrates the 
problematic nature of corporate political influence.  Because the corporation 
lacks an internal moral perspective, it, like the bad man, is constrained only 
through legal limits.  Those legal limits define the corporation’s objective 
function.  Indeed, corporate law sets forth the corporation’s purpose as the 
maximization of firm value subject to applicable legal rules.  The 
corporation’s effort to challenge legal limits may be seen as an illegitimate 
attempt to privilege the goal of profit maximization over those legal limits 
that qualify this very goal.  As such, political activism is simply ultra vires, 
beyond the corporation’s authority.  This argument is strengthened by the 
bad man’s normative status.  If the bad man acts selfishly and without 
reference to societal interests, his influence on the political process may be 
destructive. 
Robert Reich makes an argument along these lines.  Reich argues that the 
very amorality that relieves a corporation from social responsibility 
 
 89. The Noerr/Pennington doctrine, for example, excludes a corporation’s application 
for patent protection from challenge under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., James R. Atwood, 
Securing and Enforcing Patents:  The Role of Noerr/Pennington, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 651 (2001).  The doctrine is based on the Noerr and Pennington cases, Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 90. Holmes, supra note 1, at 998. 
 91. Robert W. Gordon, Law as a Vocation:  Holmes and the Lawyer’s Path, in The Path 
of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 7, 14. 
 92. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1243, 
1245-47 (1999) (describing the corporate role in politics in the late 1800s and early 1900s). 
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delegitimizes its role in politics.  According to Reich, corporations cannot 
claim that legal compliance fully meets their social responsibilities while 
simultaneously seeking to modify the social policies reflected in current 
law.  He concludes that, as a result, corporations have “a social 
responsibility to refrain from politics.”93 
Although Reich’s argument has some appeal, looking to Holmes as 
support for regulating corporate political activity is of limited value.  
Corporate political activity has been extensively regulated, starting with the 
Tillman Act and continuing most recently with the BCRA’s prohibition on 
soft money donations.  Despite this regulation, corporations continue to 
participate actively in the lawmaking process, and the enactment of 
increased regulation simply generates innovative new approaches such that, 
while the methodology may change, corporations continue to participate.  
As I have argued elsewhere,94 it is naive to believe that corporate political 
participation can be eliminated through regulation; regulation is simply too 
important to business.  As a result, it is more productive to consider whether 
the bad man offers a basis for evaluating the corporation’s role in the 
political process and guidance for the lawyer representing a corporate client 
in that process. 
Applying the bad man metaphor to corporate participation in the political 
process is, of course, a stretch.  The Path of the Law is a court-centered 
approach to the law.  In particular, The Path of the Law focuses on the role 
of lawyers in advising clients as to what courts will do.  The choice 
presented by Holmes to the bad man, through the voice of his counsel, is to 
comply with the law or to violate the law and face the “‘disagreeable 
consequences.’”95 
Political activity offers the bad man a third option—to attempt to change 
the law with which he does not wish to comply.  Although legal change can 
be accomplished through litigation, it is more likely to occur through the 
legislative process, and legislation is quite different from adjudication.  The 
lawyer’s role differs as well.  As Thomas Grey observes, the bad man does 
not require a lawyer to deal with the legislature, he can hire a lobbyist who 
does not need a law license.  Nonetheless, lawyers represent clients not just 
in understanding the law, but also in changing it. 
A comprehensive assessment of the relevance of The Path of the Law in 
understanding legislation is beyond the scope of this essay, although it 
would certainly be worthwhile to extend Holmes’s insights beyond the 
common law realm.  In the remainder of this essay, I sketch out a few ways 
in which the bad man figure and his purpose—to illuminate the distinction 
between law and morality—are of value in understanding the legislative 
process and the role of corporations in that process. 
 
 93. Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 Cal. 
Mgmt. Rev. 8, 10 (1998). 
 94. Fisch, supra note 86, at 1558-63. 
 95. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994. 
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Scholars offer a variety of models of the political process, but at opposite 
ends of the spectrum are civic republicanism and some form of public 
choice theory.  Civic republicanism conceives of lawmakers as public-
regarding, viewing “legislatures as forums for public deliberation and civic 
virtue.”96  As Jody Freeman explains, “[C]ivic republicanism portrays 
government as a moral force for the common good.”97  Public choice, in 
contrast, rejects the premise that the legislative process seeks to implement 
some concept of the public good.98  According to public choice theory, 
interest groups use politics toward their selfish ends, and interest group 
factors such as size, cohesiveness, and stakes determine the extent of their 
political power. 
Holmes’s bad man fits within the framework of public choice.  Public 
choice theory is based on the expectation that at least some of the 
participants in the political process will be bad men.  Public choice accepts 
that political participants act largely to further their private objectives; 
selfishness characterizes interest group behavior.  Holmes himself 
recognized the role of interest groups in the political process, 
acknowledging that “[t]he more powerful interests must be more or less 
reflected in legislation.”99  Moreover, public choice highlights Holmes’s 
claim about the separation of law and morals.  In Holmes’s world, law does 
not reflect the common good.100  Holmes warned that “it is certain that 
many laws have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that some are 
enforced now, which are condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the 
time.”101  Rather than serving the public good, Holmes describes the law as 
serving the “social end which the governing power of the community has 
made up its mind that it wants.”102 
Of course, the normative status of the bad man may give us pause—do 
we really want bad men to be making the law?  One response is that, even 
within a public choice framework, community values and the common good 
place limits on legislative power.  Holmes explained that although the limits 
of legislative power were not coextensive with a system of morals, the law 
was at least limited by some principles of morality.  There are some laws, 
according to Holmes, that a legislature “would not dare to enact . . . because 
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the community would rise in rebellion and fight.”103  A second argument is 
that just because the bad man acts selfishly does not mean that his 
objectives are inconsistent with the public good.  Corporations reflect the 
interests of a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in regulation, 
including stakeholders whose views might not be conveyed to lawmakers 
on an individual basis.104  To the extent that those interests are fairly 
represented, the corporation’s involvement may make the legislative 
process better informed and, in some sense, more democratic.  The third 
and perhaps most powerful response is to recognize that Holmes was a 
positivist.  His purpose in describing the separation of law and morals was 
to help us understand what the law is, not to argue for what it should be.  
And Holmes’s description offers powerful support that we cannot 
accurately understand the legislative process without incorporating the bad 
man perspective. 
And what about the lawyer representing the politically active bad man 
and, in particular, the politically active corporation?  What lessons should 
he take from Holmes?  First, Holmes’s analysis of how to counsel the bad 
man applies with equal force to political activity.  It is of little value to 
advise a corporation that it is immoral or unethical to engage in political 
activity, as demonstrated by corporate efforts to develop new strategies for 
political participation in light of increased regulatory restrictions.  If market 
forces demand political activism, the corporation will respond.  On the 
other hand, the bad man cares for the consequences of his actions and, with 
respect to political activity, the professional may assist the corporation in 
fully understanding the consequences of proposed regulatory changes. 
In particular, corporate lawyers today face the challenge of 
counterbalancing the short term perspective that has the potential to bias 
corporate decisions.  For example, when U.S. automakers lobbied in 
opposition to mandatory fuel efficiency regulations, corporate officials were 
acting out of an honest conviction that the continued manufacture of large 
cars was good for their companies.105  In retrospect, the decision appears to 
have been misguided—limited resources would and did eventually lead 
customers to demand more fuel efficient vehicles regardless of the legal 
rules, and Ford and General Motors have consequently suffered in the 
marketplace.106  Effective representation might have demonstrated to the 
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corporations that their legislative agenda was inconsistent with their long-
term corporate interests.  Similarly, ill-advised political activism can 
irreparably damage a corporation’s reputation—an effect of which the 
corporation may be unaware.107 
A second lesson for the corporate lawyer is to identify his or her client 
correctly.  As the recent corporate governance scandals illustrate, corporate 
officials may themselves be bad men who seek to further their selfish 
interests at the expense of the corporations of which they are fiduciaries.108  
Corporate lawyers who are hired by those bad men may come to identify 
with them and to defend their objectives rather than protecting the 
corporation’s own selfish interests.  Market pressures may lead corporate 
lawyers to be sycophants, unwilling to challenge the objectives of those 
executives responsible for retention decisions.  But the lawyers who aid or 
accede to the misdeeds of corporate managers betray their clients as well as 
themselves.  As Holmes observes at the end of The Path of the Law, 
happiness cannot be purchased simply by being a wealthy corporate 
lawyer.109 
Finally, the lawyer for the politically active corporation should facilitate 
the corporation’s evaluation of the effects of its political role by increasing 
transparency and accountability both within and without the corporate 
structure.  Gordon criticizes Holmes for urging lawyers to be “passive 
instruments [of their] clients’ ends rather than active forces to help refigure 
and transform those ends.”110  But too often corporate decisions break down 
because of failures in process—failures that counsel can address.  With 
respect to corporate political activity, some critics have argued that 
corporations often take political positions that are internally inconsistent or 
obviously contrary to their long-term interests because of deficiencies in the 
manner in which political activism is disclosed and debated within the 
corporation.111  Political contributions are generally not disclosed to the 
board or shareholders, nor are political expenditures generally subject to 
oversight as part of a corporation’s internal controls.  The lack of oversight 
makes it difficult for corporate decision makers and stakeholders to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of political activity.  At a minimum, a lawyer can 
assist his or her client in implementing procedures to conduct an 
appropriate cost-benefit analysis. 
A first step in the process is disclosure.  Shareholders introduced a record 
number of proposals in the past proxy season calling for increased corporate 
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disclosure of political spending.112  Unfortunately, campaign finance laws 
have often driven corporate political activity underground as corporations 
are forced to act through conduits such as trade associations, 527 
committees, and so forth.  As a result, corporate political activity is 
disguised both from corporate stakeholders and the general public.  I have 
argued elsewhere that greater transparency serves both the interests of the 
corporation and of society.113  As Holmes explained, “When you get the 
dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his 
teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”114 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Holmesian bad man may or may not be all that bad, many 
believe that the corporation is the quintessential bad man.  The bad man’s 
lack of an internal point of view and his characterization of the law as a set 
of constraints limiting his pursuit of selfish objectives seem appropriately to 
describe the relationship between corporations and the legal system.  
Corporate decision making is largely focused on maximization of firm 
value or shareholder wealth within the constraints imposed by law, posing a 
challenge to those who counsel a greater role for ethical or moral 
considerations. 
The challenge is increased by the active participation of corporations in 
the political process.  For corporations, legal rules are not externally 
imposed constraints, but tools that can be modified.  This leads to an 
apparent paradox in that corporations claim that legal compliance is the 
equivalent of social responsibility, yet, at the same time, they are able to 
control the legal constraints that define their obligations to society.  Thus, 
the politically active bad man poses a challenge for Holmesian analysis. 
Rather than frustrating the bad man analogy or offering a basis for 
condemning corporate political activity, Holmes’s ideas suggest that the 
politically active bad man fits comfortably within a public choice analysis 
of the political process.  Accepting, as Holmes did, the role of the bad man 
in the legal system illuminates the legislative process and explains, in part, 
the gap between law and morality.  Moreover, it is unclear that the selfish 
political activism of the bad man is more detrimental to societal interests 
than the activism of the good man who acts from an inner-directed sense of 
morality.  The task for future scholarship, in incorporating Holmes into an 
analysis of the political process, is to come to grips with the bad man’s role 
and to consider more fully the implications of that role for his lawyer and 
for society.   
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